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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
surrounding an arbitrator's duty to disclose prior or contemporaneous
relations with the parties? While the majority opinion purports to set
forth an absolute rule requiring disclosure, the qualification annexed
by the concurring opinion - that arbitrators need not disclose "trivial
relationships" - will undoubtedly cause much confusion. In the ab-
sence of a clear majority47 the concurring opinion carries considerable
weight. As previously indicated, the concurring justices favored dis-
closure for practical purposes while permitting the arbitrator to decide
whether his relationship with a party was substantial enough to require
disclosure. What, then, is the "trivial relationship" which need not be
disclosed? The arbitrator in Commonwealth was apparently a wealthy
man, and the business he received from the party, twelve thousand
dollars over a four or five year period, would seemingly be trivial. Yet,
the award was vacated.
Thus, no dear answer has really been provided for the critical
question of whether an arbitrator must disclose a prior or contem-
poraneous relationship with one of the parties to the arbitration
proceeding; the confusion remains, though now centered about the
interpretation of the term "trivial relationship." Only future litigation
will determine whether the disclosure rule of Commonwealth will
endure.
FAMILY LAW - JUVENILE COURTS - PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE UPHELD AS APPLICABLE STANDARD OF PROOF IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATIONS. - In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247
N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
Appellant was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for stealing $112
from complainant's pocketbook. This finding was based upon a pre-
ponderance of the evidence as required by Section 744(b) of the New
York Family Court Act. The Court of Appeals, in affirming, held that
despite the recent expansion of criminal due process in juvenile hear-
ings, the quantitative test of proof, as prescribed by the statute, was
both correctly applied and constitutional.
Prior to the juvenile court movement in the United States,1 a
47 Commonwealth was decided on a 4-2-3 basis. Thus, a possibility exists that the
Court would refuse to vacate an arbitration award involving non-disclosure of a "trivial"
relationship.
I The first juvenile court act was passed in Illinois in 1899. Law of July 1, 1899, §§ 1-21,
[1899] III. Laws 131-37. See also Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. Ray. 104 (1909).
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child reaching the age of seven was tried, convicted, and sentenced in a
criminal court as an adult.2 However, the harsh sanctions resulting from
these criminal convictions motivated the states to extend the doctrine
of parens patriae8 to their delinquency proceedings through a system
of juvenile courts. Thus, impelled by a feeling of charity, or perhaps
guilt, the state set aside the juvenile as an individual in need of help
and guidance, free from the formalities of criminal procedures and
sanctions. This humane concept spread rapidly, and today is employed
by all the states and the District of Columbia.4
The State of New York officially adopted this approach in 1922,
with the passage of the New York Children's Court Act;5 but these
concepts were not formally extended to New York City until the
passage of the New York City Children's Court Act6 in 1924. These
early systems were informal in their approach, stressing guidance rather
than retribution, and granting both the child and the court a wide
variety of rehabilitative post-adjudication alternatives. However, while
both acts ensured some basic procedural safeguards7 and set forth the
requirement of "competent" evidence,8 neither explicitly delineated
the quantum of evidence necessary for an adjudication of delinquency.
The first interpretation of "competent" evidence was provided
by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Fitzgerald,9 wherein
Judge Crane, writing for the majority, stated that "the evidence taken
in this case was not competent or sufficient to convict an adult; there-
fore, it was insufficient to convict this boy,"' 0 thereby indicating that
the state's burden of proof should be equivalent to the quantum im-
2 Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context And Juvenile Cases, 1966
Sup. CT. REv. 167, 169.
3 Parens patriae was the common law doctrine which made the sovereign the guardian
of all the dependent children in the realm. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 & nn.18-21
(1967); Mack, supra note 1.
4 387 U.S. at 14; Paulsen, supra note 2, at 169.
5 Law of April 10, 1922, ch. 547, [1922] N.Y. Laws 145th Sess. 1259 (repealed 1962)
(presently codified as N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACr of 1962).
6 Law of April 23, 1924, ch. 254, [1924] N.Y. Laws 147th Sess. 493 (repealed 1933) (re-
placed by Law of April 26, 1933, ch. 482, [1933] N.Y. Laws 156th Sess. 1038) (repealed 1962)
(presently codified as N.Y. FAMmY CT. Acr of 1962).
7 Both the New York Children's Court Act and the New York City Children's Court
Act provided for notice, a right to counsel at the discretion of the court, and appeal. Law
of April 10, 1922, ch. 547, §§ 11-12, 22, 43, [1922] N.Y. Laws 145th Sess. 1265, 1267, 1273
(repealed 1962) (presently codified as N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr of 1962); Law of April 23,
1924, ch. 254, §§ 13-14, 24, 60, [1924) N.Y. Laws 147th Sess. 500, 502-03, 512 (repealed 1933)
(replaced by Law of April 26, 1933, ch. 482, [1933] N.Y. Laws 156th Sess. 1038) (repealed
1962) (presently codified as N.Y. FAMILY Or. Acr of 1962).
8 Law of April 10, 1922, ch. 547, § 22, [1922] N.Y. Laws 145th Sess. 1267; Law of April
23, 1924, ch. 254, § 24, [1924] N.Y. Laws 147th Sess. 502.
9 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927).
'O Id. at 316, 155 N.E. at 587 (emphasis added).
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posed in an adult criminal trial. Thus, in subsequent cases, where
charges of a criminal nature were brought against a juvenile, the
courts applied the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 1
However, the Fitzgerald rationale was soon repudiated by the
Court of Appeals in People v. Lewis,' 2 which held that the rehabilita-
tive nature of juvenile hearings abrogated the necessity for criminal
standards of proof; thus, the Court was free to apply the civil test of a
fair preponderance of the evidence. The Lewis opinion stands as a
classic implementation of parens patriae because of the Court's recogni-
tion of the primary purpose of the Children's Court Act - the
elimination of the concept of crime and punishment as applied to
juveniles. The Court believed that the state intended to provide for
the care and well-being, custody and discipline of children who were
to be treated only as people in need of aid, encouragement, and
guidance, and not as adult criminal offenders:
[T]he fundamental point is that the proceeding was not a criminal one.
The State was not seeking to punish a malefactor. It was seeking to
salvage a boy who was in danger of becoming one.'3
The Court concluded that since the proceeding was not criminal,
there was no right to, or necessity for, the application of criminal
procedural safeguards.
Dissenting on the basis of his opinion in Fitzgerald, Judge Crane
questioned the constitutionality of the majority's findings, and voiced
a prophetic warning concerning the runaway application of the parens
patriae doctrine: "Can a child be deprived of his liberty.., by changing
the name of the offense.., to 'juvenile delinquency' .... At what age
do the constitutional safeguards and protection begin?"' 4 Nevertheless,
the Lewis case remained the sole authority governing juvenile pro-
ceedings until the passage of the New York Family Court Act 15 (here-
inafter Act) in 1962.
The Act provides detailed rules of procedure and attempts to cor-
rect the deficiencies of the former legislation 6 through the extension
of the constitutional concept of due process to adjudications of ju-
11 See, e.g., In re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (3d Dep't 1931).
12 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1933).
13 Id. at 177, 183 N.E. at 355.
14 Id. at 180, 183 N.E. at 356 (dissenting opinion).
'5N.Y. FAMnLy Cr. Aar § 111 et seq. (McKinney 1963). The passage of the Family
Court Act in 1962 merged the New York Children's Court Act and the New York City
Children's Court Act, thus establishing a uniform state-wide system of juvenile courts for
New York State.
16N.Y. FAmILY Cr. Aar §§ 728, 735-37, 741-42, 744(a) (McKinney 1963). See generally
Donahoe, N.Y. Family Court Act: Article 7-Its Philosophy And Its Aims, 15 SnAcus
L. REv. 679 (1964).
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venile delinquency. 17 Indeed, the application of due process to juvenile
proceedings would seem to be mandated by the quasi-criminal nature
of the adjudications, i.e., the threat of confinement which confronts
the youth involved.18 However, the courts subsequently continued to
follow the "preponderance of the evidence" rule advocated by Lewis,19
since this quantum had been codified in section 744(b) of the Act.
However, a successful constitutional challenge to the juvenile
process and its parens patriae approach was made in In re Gault,20
thereby casting a fundamental doubt on the validity of all juvenile
court proceedings which had relied upon parens patriae to justify the
dearth of procedural due process. Gerald Gault had been adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent pursuant to the Arizona Juvenile Code21 for
making a lewd telephone call. While a similar violation committed by
an adult would have resulted in a maximum sentence of two months,
or a minimum of a five dollar fine, Gault, sentenced to the
State Industrial School for the period of his minority, was confronted
with imprisonment for six years. Noting this "awesome prospect of
incarceration," 22 the Gault Court held four basic procedural rights to
be applicable to juvenile court proceedings: the right to notice of
charges; the right to counsel; the right of confrontation and cross-
examination; and the privilege against self-incrimination.
Limiting itself to these four issues, the majority rejected extrap-
olation of all the elements of criminal due process to juvenile
hearings, but declared that Gault could not constitutionally be denied
17 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Aar § 711 (McKinney 1963). See infra note 50.
18 In re Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E2.d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966). Gregory W.
illustrates that the great bulk of Lewis was overruled by the 1962 Act. Twelve year old
Gregory W. had confessed to an assault and robbery after being in custody for tventy-four
hours. He was adjudicated a delinquent largely on the testimony of the detective who
had procured his confession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since Gregory's
confession was involuntary, due process of law had not been observed. Judge Keating
explained that juvenile court proceedings, while not criminal under the Act, retained at
least a quasi-criminal character as a result of the threat of confinement confronting the
youth involved.
19 E.g., In re Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966); In re
Young, 50 Misc. 2d 271, 270 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Faro. Ct. Westchester County 1966); In re
Anonymous, 3 Misc. 2d 208, 154 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1956). Contra,
People v. Anonymous, 53 Misc. 2d 690, 279 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Nassau County Ct. 1967) (refusing
to find respondent delinquent because the state hadn't proven its case "beyond a reasonable
doubt').
20 387 US. 1 (1967). This was the first case in the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of juvenile procedures, although a previous case, Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966), had involved a related issue and presaged the Court's holding
in Gault: "There is evidence ... that he [the juvenile] gets neither the protection accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care . . . postulated for children." 383 U.S. at 556 (1966).
21 ARIz. R uv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(6)(a)(d) (1956).
22 387 US. at 36.
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was based upon a preponderance of the evidence. While admitting
that the proof did not satisfy the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard, the judge declared that his choice of law was predetermined by
the statutory requirement. 39 The sole question certified on appeal was
whether the quantum of evidence required by section 744(b) was con-
stitutionally valid in light of Gault.
Judge Bergen, writing for the majority, noted that the purpose of
juvenile law was to save, not to punish. He stressed that only limited
circumstances required commitment, and that "[n]othing could be
farther removed in temper and purpose than this [court is] from the
criminal court for adults." 40 In addition, he predictably reiterated the
stringent rationale of the Lewis decision: "'Since the proceeding was
not a criminal one, there was neither right to nor necessity for the
procedural safeguards prescribed by constitution and statute in criminal
cases.' "41 Recognizing the appellant's contention that there was "some
danger of erosion of constitutional rights in the informality and lack
of 'legality' in the way juvenile court judges in practice deal with the
children's cases," 42 the Court emphasized the offsetting safeguards: the
provision for confidentiality43 and the assurance that the adjudication
was not a conviction. 44
While acknowledging that the loss of liberty was the strongest
argument in favor of applying constitutional protections to juveniles,
Judge Bergen lamented the "singular misfortune" of the family courts
in being "impaled on the sharp points of a few hard constitutional
cases." 41 He noted, however, that Kent v. United States,46 Gault, and
the "hard" New York precedent, In re Gregory W.,47 were unique in
their lack of elementary fairness and thus easily distinguishable from
the instant case.
Significantly, in reviewing the question in the case at bar, the
Court found only tenuous differences between the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard (as a quantitative or qualitative test of proof) and
the "fair preponderance" of the evidence criterion:
39 N.Y. FAnLY CT. Acr § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).
40 24 N.Y.2d at 198, 247 N.E.2d at 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
41 Id. at 198, 247 NE.2d at 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
42 Id. at 199, 247 N.E.2d at 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
43 N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACr §§ 783-84 (McKinney 1963). See also N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr
§ 782 (McKinney 1963), which provides that an adjudication of delinquency affects no
right or privilege, including the right to hold public office or to obtain a license.
44 N.Y. FAMmY CT. Acr § 781 (McKinney 1963).
41 24 N.Y.2d at 200, 247 N-E.2d at 256, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
46 383 US. 541 (1966). See supra note 20.
47 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966). For a discussion of this case,
see supra note 18.
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It is enough to say that for a very long time one has been used in the
criminal law and the other in civil law, and that the profession accepts
the view that beyond a reasonable doubt is a "higher" standard.48
In conclusion, Judge Bergen noted that the quantum of proof necessary
for an adjudication had been expressly provided for by a statute49
which also encompassed a due process requirement.50 Furthermore,
since neither the delinquency status nor the proceedings leading to
adjudication were criminal in nature, no substantial equal protection
question was raised.
Chief Judge Fuld, in a dissent joined by Judges Burke and Keating,
construed Gault as requiring a quantum of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in all cases in which "a child may be found to have committed a
crime and [can be] incarcerated for an appreciable length of time." 51
The astute judge pointed to the contention in Gault that the juvenile
proceeding was just as serious as a felony prosecution, and concluded
that any finding of guilt not substantiated "beyond a reasonable doubt"
would be ridiculous. This standard, according to Chief Judge Fuld,
was "fundamental and universal" in our law, and essential to our
scheme of judicial due process. He also emphasized that this interpre-
tation was not unique, 52 noting that in United States v. Costanzo, 3
for example, the court stated that "[tihe Government's burden in a
juvenile case .. . is to prove all elements of the offense 'beyond a
reasonable doubt,' just as in a prosecution against an adult. . . . In
practical importance to a person charged with crime the insistence
upon a high degree of proof ranks as high as any other protection. '54
Finally, the dissent remarked that although the difference between the
two standards may be tenuous, both due process and equal protection
dearly demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt wherever personal
liberty is jeopardized. 5
Essentially, the instant case affirms the law as it stands in New
48 24 N.Y.2d at 202, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
49 N.Y. FAmILY CT. ACr § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).
50 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Aar § 711 (McKinney 1963). This section provides that "[t]he
purpose of this article is to provide a due process of law (a) for considering a claim that a
person is a juvenile delinquent or a person in need of supervision and (b) for devising an
appropriate order of disposition for any person adjudged a juvenile delinquent or in need
of supervision."
5124 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 258, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (dissenting opinion).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968); In re Urbasek, 38
Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
53 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968).
5424 N.Y.2d at 205, 247 N.E.2d at 259, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (dissenting opinion),
quoting United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441, 444-45 (4th Cir. 1968).
55 24 N.Y.2d at 206, 247 N.E.2d at 259-60, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24 (dissenting opinion).
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was based upon a preponderance of the evidence. While admitting
that the proof did not satisfy the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard, the judge declared that his choice of law was predetermined by
the statutory requirement. 39 The sole question certified on appeal was
whether the quantum of evidence required by section 744(b) was con-
stitutionally valid in light of Gault.
Judge Bergen, writing for the majority, noted that the purpose of
juvenile law was to save, not to punish. He stressed that only limited
circumstances required commitment, and that "[n]othing could be
farther removed in temper and purpose than this [court is] from the
criminal court for adults. '40 In addition, he predictably reiterated the
stringent rationale of the Lewis decision: "'Since the proceeding was
not a criminal one, there was neither right to nor necessity for the
procedural safeguards prescribed by constitution and statute in criminal
cases.' "41 Recognizing the appellant's contention that there was "some
danger of erosion of constitutional rights in the informality and lack
of 'legality' in the way juvenile court judges in practice deal with the
children's cases,"'42 the Court emphasized the offsetting safeguards: the
provision for confidentiality43 and the assurance that the adjudication
was not a conviction. 44
While acknowledging that the loss of liberty was the strongest
argument in favor of applying constitutional protections to juveniles,
Judge Bergen lamented the "singular misfortune" of the family courts
in being "impaled on the sharp points of a few hard constitutional
cases.' 46 He noted, however, that Kent v. United States,46 Gault, and
the "hard" New York precedent, In re Gregory W.,47 were unique in
their lack of elementary fairness and thus easily distinguishable from
the instant case.
Significantly, in reviewing the question in the case at bar, the
Court found only tenuous differences between the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard (as a quantitative or qualitative test of proof) and
the "fair preponderance" of the evidence criterion:
3 9 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).
40 24 N.Y.2d at 198, 247 N.E.2d at 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
41 Id. at 198, 247 N.E.2d at 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
4211d. at 199, 247 N.E.2d at 255, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
43 N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Aar §§ 783-84 (McKinney 1963). See also N.Y. FAMmY CT. Acr
§ 782 (McKinney 1963), which provides that an adjudication of delinquency affects no
right or privilege, including the right to hold public office or to obtain a license.
44 N.Y. FAMIY CT. ACr § 781 (McKinney 1963).
45 24 N.Y.2d at 200, 247 N.E.2d at 256, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
46 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See supra note 20.
47 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966). For a discussion of this case,
see supra note 18.
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It is enough to say that for a very long time one has been used in the
criminal law and the other in civil law, and that the profession accepts
the view that beyond a reasonable doubt is a "higher" standard.48
In conclusion, Judge Bergen noted that the quantum of proof necessary
for an adjudication had been expressly provided for by a statute49
which also encompassed a due process requirement. 50 Furthermore,
since neither the delinquency status nor the proceedings leading to
adjudication were criminal in nature, no substantial equal protection
question was raised.
Chief Judge Fuld, in a dissent joined by Judges Burke and Keating,
construed Gault as requiring a quantum of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in all cases in which "a child may be found to have committed a
crime and [can be] incarcerated for an appreciable length of time." 51
The astute judge pointed to the contention in Gault that the juvenile
proceeding was just as serious as a felony prosecution, and concluded
that any finding of guilt not substantiated "beyond a reasonable doubt"
would be ridiculous. This standard, according to Chief Judge Fuld,
was "fundamental and universal" in our law, and essential to our
scheme of judicial due process. He also emphasized that this interpre-
tation was not unique,5 2 noting that in United States v. Costanzo,5 3
for example, the court stated that "[t]he Government's burden in a
juvenile case . . . is to prove all elements of the offense 'beyond a
reasonable doubt,' just as in a prosecution against an adult. . . . In
practical importance to a person charged with crime the insistence
upon a high degree of proof ranks as high as any other protection."54
Finally, the dissent remarked that although the difference between the
two standards may be tenuous, both due process and equal protection
clearly demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt wherever personal
liberty is jeopardized. 5
Essentially, the instant case affirms the law as it stands in New
48 24 N.Y.2d at 202, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
49 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Aar § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).
50 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 711 (McKinney 1963). This section provides that "[t]he
purpose of this article is to provide a due process of law (a) for considering a claim that a
person is a juvenile delinquent or a person in need of supervision and (b) for devising an
appropriate order of disposition for any person adjudged a juvenile delinquent or in need
of supervision."
5124 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 258, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (dissenting opinion).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968); In re Urbasek, 38
Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
53 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968).
54 24 N.Y.2d at 205, 247 N.E.2d at 259, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (dissenting opinion),
quoting United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441, 444-45 (4th Cir. 1968).
55 24 N.Y.2d at 206, 247 N.E.2d at 259-60, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24 (dissenting opinion).
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York. Unfortunately, the Court considered the practical and constitu-
tional aspects of the problem in a somewhat cursory manner. Hence,
the end result is an affirmation of an anachronism which exists in the
juvenile courts of New York.
An adult who committed Samuel W.'s offense would have been
charged with one of the following crimes: robbery in the third degree;56
grand larceny in the third degree; 57 or petit larceny.58 The adult
offender, convicted and sentenced by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,59
could conceivably be released after less than one year imprisonment. 60
A teenager entitled to "youthful offender" treatment (ages 16 to 19) 61
would enjoy all the protections and guarantees available to the adult,
including conviction only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
early release.62 Yet, because Samuel W. was only twelve years old, he
was confronted with a period of incarceration ranging up to nine
years. Thus, a child subject to the benevolence and safe keeping of
the family court, where culpability is assessed by a "fair preponderance
of the evidence", is actually burdened with a longer sentence than is
the "hardened criminal". At the very least, such a disposition is
illogical.
Notwithstanding the practical aspects of the problem, the partial
failure of the juvenile court system prior to Gault must also be con-
sidered.63 Recidivism among juveniles has not declined; if anything,
it has become more frequent. 64 Of even greater import is the fact that
56 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 160.05 (McKinney 1967) (a class D felony). § 70 provides for a
maximum sentence of seven years for a class D felony.
57 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.30(4) (McKinney 1967) (a class E felony). § 70 provides for
a maximum sentence of four years for a class E felony.
58 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.25 (McKinney 1967) (a class A misdemeanor). § 70.15 provides
for a maximum sentence not to exceed one year imprisonment for a class A misdemeanor.
59 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 389 (McKinney 1958). Accord, People v. Sanabria, 42 Misc.
2d 464, 249 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964) (although proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not explicitly mandated by the New York Constitution).
60 For a class A misdemeanor the maximum sentence shall not exceed 1 year, N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 70.15 (McKinney 1967). There also exists for the class D or E felon the
possibility of a sentence under one year if the court so wishes, in light of the person's history
and character and the nature and circumstances underlying the crime. N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 70.05 (McKinney 1967).
91 N.Y. CODE CRU, PROC. § 913(e) (McKinney 1958). There is, however, this proviso:
the crime he commits must not be punishable by death or life imprisonment. Also, a
previous felony conviction will preclude "youthful offender" treatment.
62 N.Y. CODE GRIB. PROC. § 913(q) (McKinney 1958).
63 See generally Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUm.
L. REv. 281 (1967); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, And Individual
justice, 79 -AIv. L. REv. 775 (1966).
64 See REPORT or THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUsTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE Socmir 55, 78 (1967).
In fiscal 1966 approximately 66 percent of the 16 and 17 year-old juveniles referred
to the court by the Youth Aid Division had been before the court previously. In 1965,
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institutional confinement is not necessarily in the best interests of the
child. Abstracting even a short length of time from the juvenile's
growing years may inflict upon him an indelible mark;65 hence, any
pretense that the juvenile's confinement is not punitive is self-deceiv-
ing.66
It should be re-emphasized that the instant decision was based
on the quantum of proof prescribed by Section 744(b) of the Act
which constitutes the basic rationale behind the Court's opinion. How-
ever, regardless of the statutory authority, it seems that proof beyond
a reasonable doubt should be the quantum necessary to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process. While the Supreme Court has never spe-
cificially endorsed such a standard, there have been intimations to this
effect. 67 Viewing these implications in light of Section 889 of the New
York Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in a criminal action, the due process rationale of Gault
becomes significant. Due process was extended to juvenile adjudications
by the Gault Court because the infant, upon conviction, is branded a
delinquent and may be committed to a state institution. 8 Essentially,
due process requires that the procedural regularity and fair play which
is implicit in our concept of liberty and justice, and which is incorpo-
rated into our criminal system, will be extended to and observed in our
juvenile proceedings.6 9 Thus, the critical question can be posed as
follows: Does proof beyond a reasonable doubt constitute a part of
this procedural regularity and fair play? The answer lies in the dis-
56 percent of those in the Receiving Home were repeaters. The SRI [Stanford Research
Institute] study revealed that 61 percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965
had been previously referred at least once and that 42 percent had been referred at
last twice before.
In re Gault 387 U.S. at 22, quoting REPORT OF THE PREsmENr's COntMISSION oN CRIME IN
THm Dnucr oF CoLumBiA (1966).
65 See Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
The judgment against a youth that he is delinquent is a serious reflection upon his
character and habits. The stain against him is not removed merely because the statute
says no judgment in this particular proceeding shall be deemed a conviction for crime
or so considered. The stigma of conviction will reflect upon him for life. It hurts his
self-respect. It may, at some inopportune, unfortunate moment, rear its ugly head to
destroy his opportunity for advancement, and blast his ambition to build up a charac-
ter and reputation .... Guilt should be proven by evidence which leaves no reasonable
doubt.
Id. at 341, 38 S.E.2d at 447.
66 See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function
and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7; Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46
CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961).
67 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453-54 (1895).
68 387 U.S. at 13. The Gault Court also quoted from its decision in Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 601 (1948): "Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by
methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law."
69 387 US. at 27-28.
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crimination which is manifest in the structure of our juvenile court
system. It seems dear that every criminal in New York, as long as he
is over sixteen, is entitled to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. But if he is of a lesser age, the quantum becomes a fair prepon-
derance. Such a policy is contrary to the fundamental fairness which is
basic to due process. Moreover, this quantum issue is not merely
tangential, but rather is essential to a fair adjudication when liberty
is at stake.70 Regardless of terminology, juvenile court proceedings
and criminal convictions result in an identical loss of freedom.
The juvenile offenders of New York deserve a better status than
that of "paper citizens" - they are entitled to the same protection and
rights as their elder brothers and sisters. And this protection must
include the right to be adjudged innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Samuel W. decision marks a hiatus in New
York's juyenile law; for the Court of Appeals has apparently repudiated
the state's formerly progressive attitude in the juvenile area. Clearly,
the value of other constitutional guarantees is minimized when an
individual can be convicted on a mere preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, the only viable solution consonant with the rationale of Gault
is to extend the thrust of that opinion to the quantum of evidence
required in a juvenile proceeding. Only through such an extension can
the juvenile be assured the constitutional guarantee of due process
which Gault envisioned.
TORT - DEFAMATION - EXECUTIvE PRIVILEGE TO DEFAME Ex-
TENDED TO UNDERCOVER AGENT ACTING PURSUANT TO ORDERS. - Heine
v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968).
Appellee, an undercover agent for the Central Intelligence Agency
(hereinafter CIA), informed members of an anti-Communist league of
which he was a member that appellant was a Soviet agent. Appellant
brought an action for slander in a federal district court which resulted
in summary judgment for the appellee. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in vacating the judgment and remanding for further
proceedings, held that the absolute governmental immunity from tort
liability for defamation was available to an agent who acted pursuant
to instructions issued with the approval of the Director of the CIA or
70 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
We do not mean... to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all
of the requirements of a criminal trial . . . but we do hold that the hearing must
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Id. at 562.
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